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THE RHETORIC HITS THE ROAD: STATE
CHALLENGES TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
IMPLEMENTATION
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard *
I. INTRODUCTION
What is it about health reform—about the particular exercise
of federal power to compel the purchase of health insurance by
1
individuals —that has sparked such concerted objection from
states? Congress has reached deeply into areas of traditional
state authority on other occasions in recent memory,2 without
similarly provoking a majority of states to file federal lawsuits or
engage in a multi-front attack to dismantle a validly enacted federal statute. How has a federal law, which most clearly infringes
on individual rather than states‘ rights, become the rallying cry
for a nationwide Tenth Amendment reinvigoration movement? In
keeping with the 2011 Allen Chair Symposium‘s ―Everything But
the Merits‖ theme, this essay considers states‘ lawsuits not merely beyond the merits but even beyond the litigation itself and
places the litigation strategy in the larger context of other forms
of state resistance to implementation of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (―ACA‖ or ―Act‖).3

* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D., 1999, University of
Georgia; B.A., 1993, Columbia University. I am grateful to Carl Tobias and Kevin Walsh
for inviting me to the 2011 Allen Chair Symposium and all of the Symposium participants
for a stimulating discussion.
1. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010).
2. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 50
U.S.C.) (enlisting state law enforcement to carry out federal law); Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–40703, 108 Stat. 1902, 1902–55 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (purporting to federalize crime of domestic violence); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2006) (setting national standards with
which state standards must comply).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
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The following discussion provides an update and reanalysis of
my previously published article, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, which made
an affirmative case for the widespread trend of state resistance to
the then-recently enacted ACA.4 In the months just before and after the ACA was signed into law, a significant number of states
engaged in various forms of objection, including, but not limited
to, filing lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the new
federal statute.5 My earlier article focused on five targets of state
resistance: (1) Medicaid expansion, (2) high-risk insurance pools,
(3) health insurance exchanges, (4) federal insurance market reg6
ulations, and (5) the individual mandate. I identified reasons
why state-based dissent to the ACA should not be disregarded
simply as partisan sour grapes by ―Obamacare‖ opponents but instead should be considered valuable to the health care decisionmaking process and federal-state relations.7
Scholars have struggled to define an overarching model of federalism8 and to justify placing primary authority for regulating
health care in federal or state hands.9 The complexity of the
health care system and debates over recent federal legislation
glaringly reveal the futility of such efforts. We are left instead

(codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Education Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1305 (Supp. IV 2010)).
4. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 111 (2010).
5. Id. at 113–17.
6. Id. at 132–61.
7. Id. at 161–68.
8. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1229–30 (1994); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258–60 (2009); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1950); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (1998); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 933 (1994); Robert
A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246–49
(2005); Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 459 (1938); Philip
J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 663, 665–67 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?:
Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y
199, 205 (2011); Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism,
35 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 203, 204–08 (2010); Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The
Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the
ACA, 20 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 266, 272–73 (2011).
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with a theoretically unsatisfying but descriptively accurate
―muddled federalism,‖10 which functions, within pragmatic and
political limits, to effectuate an array of sweeping health reforms.
Like my earlier article, this essay traces the various rhetorical
arguments raised by states in opposition to federal health reform,
through which states identify different and sometimes conflicting
federalism values. At times, states frame objections to the ACA in
structural terms regarding the scope of federal power, noting
their sovereign interest in retaining control over state legislative
and administrative functions. Other arguments highlight the importance of diversity and local tailoring of policies to local tastes
and needs. State opponents also emphasize the underlying purpose of the federalist system in protecting individuals from excessive government intrusion. Nevertheless, states also tacitly
acknowledge that certain problems are better suited to national
regulation. I conclude by echoing my earlier suggestion that this
11
inevitable muddle, as displayed in the health reform context,
should be regarded as one of federalism‘s defining strengths.
II. BACKGROUND
We are less than two years away from the effective date of
some of the most dramatic reforms under the ACA,12 including
13
operation of health insurance exchanges, prohibition on health14
status underwriting and exclusions based on pre-existing health
15
16
conditions, expansion of Medicaid eligibility, imposition of em17
ployer penalties, and the requirement that most Americans
maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage.18 I first
examined the trend of state resistance to federal health reform
during the months of heated congressional and public debate

10. Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 289 (characterizing the ACA‘s approach as
―muddled federalism‖).
11. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 168.
12. See Implementation Timeline, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://healthre
form.kff.org/Timeline.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Implementation Timeline].
13. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (Supp. IV 2010).
14. Id. § 300gg (Supp IV 2010).
15. Id. § 300gg-3.
16. Id. § 1396a.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H) (Supp. IV 2010).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010).
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leading up to the ACA‘s enactment on March 23, 2010.19 This essay continues that examination at a critical junction, after the
public and lawmakers have had two years to digest the massive
legislation, with Supreme Court resolution of constitutional challenges pending in July 2012 and near complete implementation of
key reforms scheduled for January 2014.
Before the ACA was enacted, it certainly made sense for states
to engage in the policy debate over whether comprehensive federal health reform was needed and, if so, what form it should take.
States have been active regulators of the health care and health
insurance markets for much of the nation‘s history.20 Broad federal preemption of one area of insurance regulation—namely, employer health plans—has constrained states‘ ability to regulate
21
those plans since the 1970s. Until the ACA, however, nothing
other than political opposition at the state level prevented states
from adopting their own comprehensive health reform laws, such
22
as Massachusetts‘s 2006 legislation. States were also free to enact statutes or constitutional amendments prohibiting, at least
within their own borders, certain types of health reforms, such as
a public health insurance plan or a mandate that all citizens purchase health insurance, as several states did in the months before
the ACA was passed.23
After President Obama signed the ACA into law, states continued to express vigorous opposition through various channels, including proposing state legislation purporting to nullify or opt out
of the new federal health law.24 Although the most frequent target
of proposed state nullification statutes and constitutional amendments was the individual health insurance mandate, states also
attempted to opt out of new federal requirements on employers
19. Leonard, supra note 4, at 113, 167–68 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26, and 42 U.S.C.)).
20. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits
of Grandfathering Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 763 (2011) (describing the history of state regulation).
21. See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
22. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006
Mass. Acts 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the General Laws of Mass.).
23. Leonard, supra note 4, at 113–14; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1(Cum.
Supp. 2011) (―No resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage . . . .‖).
24. Leonard, supra note 4, at 113–15.
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and state regulators.25 As a matter of federal supremacy, those
state laws without question lacked legal effect and force. Similarly, states‘ lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ACA,
filed within hours of the Act‘s enactment, seemed to have little
legal merit. In the early days of the ACA, states also registered
objection by refusing to cooperate with the federal government in
implementing particular provisions of the Act. When I wrote previously, states were vociferously rejecting the federal government‘s invitation to establish state high-risk insurance pools,
which were to be in place just three months after the ACA‘s enactment.26
Most commentators dismissed states‘ legislation,27 lawsuits,
and other forms of resistance as mere symbolic acts, political the28
ater, or Tea Party gamesmanship. While I agreed that the state
resistance movement largely lacked legal merit, I suggested that
the rhetoric of state resistance, specifically, invocation of structural concerns regarding states‘ rights and limits on federal power, were valuable in their own right.29 States‘ tactics did not universally foster salutary benefits for the federalist system but nor
were they necessarily damaging to it. I articulated six specific
values of ―rhetorical federalism‖ derived from state-based dissent
to the ACA that included: (1) bringing transparency to the implementation process, (2) educating the electorate on discrete issues of the law, (3) expressing minority views, (4) depoliticizing
the issues, (5) codifying dissent, and (6) highlighting the increased role of government in health care delivery.30 With one notable exception, the state-based health reform resistance movement continues to promote those values. My suggestion that
rhetorical federalism could depoliticize the issues and diffuse par-

25. Id. at 113–15, 155; see also Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011, THE NAT‘L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906 (last updated Jan. 27, 2012).
26. Leonard, supra note 4, at 140–44 (regarding high-risk insurance pools).
27. State legislation took various forms, modeled on the American Legislative Exchange Council‘s ―Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act.‖ See ALEC’s Health Care Freedom Initiative, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/initiatives/healthcare-freedom-initiative/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
28. Leonard, supra note 4, at 116–18.
29. Id. at 117–18 (suggesting that ―[r]ather than dismiss the [state nullification]
trend, its persistence and pervasiveness warrants consideration‖ and identifying positive
effects for ―federal-state relations deriving from the federalism objections being voiced by
health reform opponents‖).
30. Id. at 162–68.
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tisan political fights over the ACA, however, is almost laughable
given the current climate. Structural federalism objections have
hardly mitigated the rancor but have become the central, defining
contention. The rhetoric has indeed hit the road.
If nothing else, this ongoing project of examining state-based
resistance confirms my failure as a health reform prognosticator.
At the time of the previous article, I confessed surprise that Congress managed to pass a comprehensive, sea-changing package of
health reform legislation.31 Now I must admit that I did not expect the federalism rhetoric animating the health reform debate
to be accorded serious legal merit. That not just one, but seven,
separate petitions for certiorari, from four circuit courts, including two challenges involving states as plaintiffs, were filed with
32
the Supreme Court is remarkable. The fact that the case and
main substantive issue that the Court has agreed to hear involves
twenty-six states‘ challenges to the scope of federal power to regu33
late individual citizens is potentially both a stunning endorsement of New Federalism and a novel recognition of enforceable
Tenth Amendment rights.34
In this essay, I revisit the five previously identified fronts of
state resistance, providing a two-year update of successes and
failures. I also describe states‘ new strategies, including requesting waivers from various provisions of the ACA, declining or returning federal funding for the ACA implementation, enacting
state legislation and multi-state compacts purporting to opt out of
the ACA, and adopting novel litigation postures. Although states‘
tactics, in many cases, still stand on shaky legal grounds, the
rhetoric of federalism has gained better traction than other com-

31. Id. at 113.
32. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, ___ S.
Ct. ___ (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529
(6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. Ct. ___ (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, ___
S. Ct. ___ (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420); Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S.
Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400).
33. See supra note 32; see also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1282 (addressing the constitutionality of the individual mandate under commerce power); Bradley
Joondeph, Handicapping the Questions Presented, ACA LITIG. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:30
PM),
http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/handicapping-questions-presented.ht
ml.
34. See infra Part III (describing the existing paradox in individual mandate litigation).
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mentators and I initially predicted. Expressions of state resistance resonate deeply, not just in public debate, but also in judicial opinions. In light of the shifting battleground, I reconsider
the values of rhetorical federalism.
III. FIVE FRONTS OF STATE RESISTANCE
A. Medicaid Expansion
As the ACA provision with the clearest state nexus, Medicaid
expansion has proven the most impenetrable to state challenges.
35
Medicaid is the quintessential cooperative federalism program.
States voluntarily agree to implement state-based health care
programs that meet broad federal requirements in exchange for
federal funding commensurate with state spending on those programs.36 For almost two decades before the ACA‘s enactment, all
fifty states voluntarily agreed to participate in the cooperative
federal-state Medicaid program in order to provide health care to
low-income and other qualified needy individuals.37
The Florida lawsuit brought by twenty-six states, two private
plaintiffs, and a business organization challenged the ACA‘s expansion of Medicaid squarely on Tenth Amendment grounds.38 In
particular, the plaintiffs argued that the ACA‘s new requirement
to extend Medicaid to all children, parents, and childless adults
under 133% of federal poverty level amounted to coercion, in violation of judicially recognized limits on federal conditional spending power in South Dakota v. Dole.39 The states‘ Medicaid chal40
lenge was rejected by Judge Roger Vinson, the Florida federal

35. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing Medicaid as ―a cooperative
endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating
States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons‖); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre
Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419 (2008) (―Medicaid is a classic example of cooperative federalism
. . . .‖).
36. See 42. U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
37. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 135 & n.159.
38. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1240, 1262–64.
39. Id. at 1261–62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)). In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme
Court stated that ―[o]ur decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.‖ 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
40. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1263, 1266, 1269–70 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 648
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district judge who struck down the ACA in its entirety,41 after
holding the individual mandate unconstitutional.42 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed Judge Vinson‘s Medicaid ruling,43 holding that
because states continue to have a real choice whether to participate, the ACA‘s expanded Medicaid eligibility did not amount to
coercion.44
In particular, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, from its inception, the Medicaid statute reserved Congress‘s right to alter,
amend, or repeal the Medicaid Act.45 Moreover, the court reasoned
that states received ample notice of the ACA‘s eligibility changes,
effectively, four years from the Act‘s enactment—given that the
federal government will pay all the costs of covering newly eligi46
ble enrollees for the first two years. The Eleventh Circuit‘s conclusion seems well-supported by previous challenges to congressional amendments to Medicaid and similar conditional spending
acts.47 Despite the court‘s reasoning and the absence of a circuit
split, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the plaintiffs‘ Medicaid
challenge.48

F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
41. Id. at 1304–05.
42. Id. at 1298–99.
43. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1268.
44. Id. at 1267–68.
45. Id. at 1267 (―The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter of
the [Medicaid Act] is hereby reserved to the Congress.‖ (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. Id. at 1267–68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. IV 2010)).
47. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1980) (finding the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act created shared responsibilities between the federal and state governments); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 593–95 (1937) (rejecting the claim that the Social Security Act‘s tax collection and unemployment benefits distribution infringes on state sovereignty); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (explaining the concept of conditional spending power); see
also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1267 (discussing the history of Medicaid Act
amendments); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that ―Medicaid is a voluntary program in which states are free to choose whether to participate‖);
California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding an additional
Medicaid requirement to cover emergency medical care to illegal immigrants); Oklahoma
v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 416–17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the pass through provision of the Social Security Act was a ―conventional and appropriate‖ use of congressional
power under the spending clause). In Texas v. Leavitt, the plaintiffs requested for original
jurisdiction to review Medicare Part D ―clawback,‖ which required states to pay a portion
of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit. Plaintiffs‘ Reply Brief at 1, Texas v.
Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (No. 135), 2006 WL 1491289. The Supreme Court was unwilling even to hear the challenge, denying the states‘ petition for original jurisdiction.
Texas, 547 U.S. at 1204.
48. See Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-400, ___ U.S. ___,
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Other than the Florida lawsuit challenging the ACA‘s Medicaid
expansion, no state has taken the next and obvious step of simply
declining to participate in the federal program. If the new federal
requirements are objectionable, states can simply opt out of them.
No federal law compels state participation, but states receive federal funding only if they voluntarily agree to establish a state
Medicaid program in compliance with federal standards.49 States
could choose to provide no public health care to low-income residents or to establish fully state-administered, state-funded indigent health care programs. Only one state‘s governor and former
presidential candidate, Rick Perry, in November 2010 blustered
about the possibility of Texas opting out of Medicaid, but fairly
50
quickly backed off of that threat.
States‘ continued cooperation with federal Medicaid requirements or, at least, continued acceptance of federal Medicaid dollars, would, in one view, seem to support the coercion argument.
Indeed, the plaintiff states argued that the new Medicaid eligibility requirements are coercive inasmuch as states simply cannot
afford to decline federal Medicaid funding, no matter how onerous
51
the new conditions. It seems just as plausible, however, that the
federal government would be hard put to fully fund and operate
indigent health programs in all fifty states without state cooperation. Given federal dependence on continued state cooperation in
Medicaid, states should retain some political power to influence
52
the debate and shape the Medicaid program going forward.
Thus far, however, states‘ proposed innovations mostly take
the form of requesting federal funding with few strings at53
tached—that is, Medicaid block grants. A similar notion under-

2011 WL 5515165, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011).
49. 42 U.S.C § 1396a(b) (Supp. IV 2010); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass‘n, 496 U.S. 498, 502
(1990); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
50. Texas Gov. Perry Backs Away from Medicaid Dropout Threat, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/2010/december/04/
news-detail.aspx.
51. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1266 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (summarizing states‘ coercion argument), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
52. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 8, at 1266–68 (describing states‘ power
as ―servants‖ on which the federal government depends to administer federal programs);
Leonard, supra note 4, at 138 (discussing the Bulman-Pozen & Gerken theory in context of
the ACA Medicaid resistance).
53. See Are Block Grants the Wave of the Future for Medicaid?, 19 ST. HEALTH WATCH,
Sept. 2011, at 1, 1–3 [hereinafter Block Grants] (discussing states‘ efforts to reform Medi-
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lies Medicaid Section 1115 (―Section 1115‖),54 a long-standing,
pre-ACA provision that allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements or
provide federal matching dollars for state Medicaid costs that
otherwise would not qualify.55 Section 1115 waivers allow states
to experiment with alternative approaches to the problem of access to health care and tailor their Medicaid programs to particular state needs.56 Over the years, states have received Section
1115 waivers of varying scope and purpose and have implemented unique Medicaid strategies and programs to varying success.57
The ACA affirms the availability of Section 1115 waivers but provides additional administrative and congressional oversight,
58
somewhat limiting state flexibility.
Concerned over the expected increased costs of adding millions
more people to Medicaid rolls in 2014, states have proposed even
more comprehensive waivers in the form of lump sum payments,
59
rather than the current federal percentage-on-the-dollar match.

caid with less federal involvement).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006).
55. Id. § 1315(a).
56. See Medicaid Waivers and Demonstrations List, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medi
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (listing 459 projects); Medicaid Waivers and Demonstration Projects
Through Map of States, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program
-Information/By-State/By-State.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (cataloguing all fifty
states demonstration projects).
57. See Block Grants, supra note 53, at 2–3 (describing Tennessee and Oregon experiments); Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, State Model: Oregon The Ups and Downs of
Oregon’s Rationing Plan, Health Affairs, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS, no. 2, 1996, at 66–67 (discussing Oregon‘s ―Reform Demonstration‖ for waiving different Medicaid requirements);
Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let 1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of State-Level
Health-Care Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1173, 1185–86 (2007) (describing Massachusetts‘s
1996 Section 1115 waiver); Cyril F. Chang, Evolution of TennCare Yields Valuable Lessons, MANAGED CARE, Nov. 2007, at 45. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 438 (2011) (describing various forms of state waivers,
including Section 1115 waivers, which ―offer[] the most flexibility and allow[] state experiments‖).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 713 (Supp. IV 2010).
59. Mary Agnes Carey & Marilyn Werber Serafini, How Medicaid Block Grants Would
Work, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
2011/March/07/block-grants-medicaid-faq.aspx? (describing several state governors‘ demands for Medicaid block grants); Peggy Venable, Medicaid Block-Grant Momentum
Builds, ODESSA AM. ONLINE (July 14, 2011), http://www.oaoa.com/articles/state-68506medicaid-health.html (Texas state director of Americans for Prosperity, advocating for
state waiver to ―give Texas the opportunity to run our own Medicaid program, tailored to
the unique needs and priorities of our citizens‖); see also infra note 238 and accompanying
text (discussing the Health Care Freedom Compacts).
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Former Massachusetts governor and Republican presidential
candidate Mitt Romney‘s economic plan proposed Medicaid block
grants nationwide.60 It may be no coincidence that Massachusetts‘s comprehensive state health reform was made politically
feasible, in large part, by the threatened expiration of that state‘s
Section 1115 waiver.61 States urge that block grants would allow
them to administer their own Medicaid programs more efficiently
and better tailored to their residents‘ needs than presently allowed under federal requirements.62 Moreover, they note that the
current conditional funding approach incentivizes cost inflation,
not cost containment, because the more states spend, the more
63
federal matching dollars they receive. Under a block grant,
states would receive finite funding and would have an incentive
64
to control costs.
Critics of Medicaid block grants express concern that states
will undermine the Medicaid safety net by dropping needy people
from their programs to reduce costs, as infamously occurred under TennCare.65 Moreover, experience with the state Children‘s
Health Insurance Program (―CHIP‖), a block-grant program,
demonstrates that states struggled to control their budgets and
required additional federal funding to sustain the programs.66
Concerns about decreased state accountability under federal
block grants are exacerbated by judicial limits on individual
causes of action to enforce federal Medicaid requirements against

60. See Sam Baker, Romney Plan Calls for Medicaid Block Grants, Repeal of Obama
Health Law, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/poli
tics-elections/179725-romney-plan-calls-for-medicaid-block-grants-repeal-of-obama-healthlaw.
61. Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual
Health Insurance, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2007).
62. See Carey & Serafini, supra note 59; Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 548–49 (citing
New York and Massachusetts as examples of successful Section 1115 waivers); Venable,
supra note 59.
63. Carey & Serafini, supra note 59; Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 474–76; Venable,
supra note 59.
64. See Carey & Serafini, supra note 59; Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 572; Venable,
supra note 59.
65. Block Grants, supra note 53, at 1. Matthew Mitchell, noted that Tennessee‘s expansion of Medicaid resulted in the state ―dramatically draw[ing] back eligibility,‖ and
―[o]vernight, 200,000 people were dropped from the Medicaid rolls.‖ Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
66. See Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 582 & n.205 (suggesting that states overspent
federal CHIP allotments, requiring expanding federal funding through program reauthorization).
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states.67 In the past, individual Medicaid enrollees and providers
could bring § 1983 lawsuits against state authorities to compel
compliance with federal Medicaid requirements.68 Recent judicial
decisions, however, have severely limited the availability of those
entitlement claims.69 Some courts, while rejecting the § 1983
cause of action, have allowed individuals to challenge state Medicaid policies on federal supremacy grounds.70 The viability of
those challenges is before the Supreme Court this term.71 But if
states are allowed to act freely under block grants without having
to comply with federal conditions, there would be little basis for
either a § 1983 challenge or a preemption challenge to potentially
radical state Medicaid cuts.
An alternative to block grants, which dissenting states have
not advocated, is to federalize Medicaid, thereby placing full responsibility for indigent health care on the federal government.72
The ACA moves in the direction of federalizing the program by
requiring the federal government to bear the full costs of newly
eligible Medicaid recipients for the first two years of the program‘s expansion and 90% of the cost of new enrollees perpetual73
ly, beginning in 2020. The generous federal funding for the
ACA‘s Medicaid expansion, not surprisingly, has drawn no appar-

67. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 297, 305–06, 311
(1996) (observing that ―eliminating entitlements in connection with a shift to block grants
moves power away from the people, not just the central government, in order to give that
power to state government‖).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing a private cause of action for individuals injured by a state official‘s ―deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by‖
federal laws); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass‘n, 496 U.S. 498, 523–24 (1990) (allowing an association of hospitals to enforce the Medicaid requirement that states provide reasonable and
adequate payment to participating providers).
69. E.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290–91 (2002) (narrowing the availability of a § 1983 cause of action pertaining to the nondisclosure provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974).
70. E.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509–13 (8th Cir. 2006).
71. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 590 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 131A S. Ct. 992 (2011) (No. 09-958) (challenging state legislation reducing
Medi-Cal provider payments on supremacy clause grounds); see Sara Rosenbaum, Equal
Access for Medicaid Beneficiaries—The Supreme Court and the Douglas Cases, NEW ENG.
J. MED., Dec. 15, 2011, at 2245, 2245–46.
72. See Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 435–36; Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 67, at 320
(―The sensible approach to the Medicaid issue would seem to be for the federal government
to fund and regulate all Medicaid activities . . . .‖); Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 282–
84 (discussing the advantages of federalizing Medicaid).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(y)(1)(A), (E) (Supp. IV 2010).
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ent state opposition.74 But states stop short of simply passing off
responsibility for Medicaid to the federal government. Why states
continue to cling to the indigent health care budget and policy
hot-potato is not entirely clear. The continued grudging cooperation between states and the federal government in Medicaid funding and administration reveals a sort of dysfunctional functional
federalism.75 While neither partner seems entirely satisfied with
the level of effort, support, and commitment that the other invests, neither has proposed a radical new approach.
In the unlikely event that the Supreme Court holds the ACA‘s
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional, the playing field would be
dramatically altered. First, Medicaid expansion is expected to account for more than half, or close to sixteen million of the thirty76
two million newly insured individuals under the ACA. If Medicaid cannot be expanded to cover those individuals, the exchanges, commercial insurance market regulations, and other proposals
would have to be reconsidered and expanded to meet the ACA‘s
goal of near universal health insurance coverage. Second, numerous existing and new initiatives under the ACA rely on condition77
al spending power. As a practical matter, any further limitations
that the Court imposes would restrict Congress‘s authority to
amend existing programs in which states already participate, or
to implement new cooperative programs. Finally, any such decision from the Court would signal a broad shift in the allocation of
power between the federal government and state governments. In
sum, although seemingly settled, the Supreme Court‘s grant of
review leaves the Medicaid front very much still in play.

74. See Cauchi, supra note 25.
75. Cf. David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1222–23 (2004) (describing functional federalism and examining theory
in Medicaid context).
76. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, House of Representatives, tbl.2 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov
/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf (predicting that by 2019, sixteen million more people
with be covered by Medicaid and CHIP, above the thirty-five million Americans who currently receive Medicaid, to reduce the overall number of uninsured by thirty-two million
people).
77. See, e.g., Bradley Joondeph, Big News Is the Medicaid Grant, ACA LITIG. BLOG
(Nov. 14, 2011, 7:36 AM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/big-news-is-med
icaid-grant.html.
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B. High-Risk Insurance Pools
One of the earliest ACA provisions to be implemented was the
Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (the ―PCIP‖), aimed at one
of the most frequent consumer complaints about the health insurance industry—the inability of individuals who most need insurance to obtain it.78 Insurance companies, quite rationally, prefer not to issue policies to individuals with costly, pre-existing
health conditions. Insurers that are willing to write policies for
such individuals, absent the loss-spreading advantages of large
group risk pools, typically charge very high premiums. Accordingly, many individuals diagnosed with grave or chronic illnesses either cannot obtain coverage or cannot afford the insurance plans
offered by the insurance companies.79
Effective 2014, all health insurers participating in the exchanges will be prohibited from denying coverage to anyone based
on health status80 and from considering patient-specific factors
other than individual or family policy, geography, and, to limited
81
extents, age and tobacco use, in setting premiums. Those guaranteed issue and community rating provisions, combined with rationalization and standardization of health insurance markets
82
through the exchanges, are designed to make meaningful, affordable health insurance available to all. In the meantime, however, people with pre-existing conditions who have been without
health insurance face the existing market discrimination. Accordingly, the ACA includes a temporary high-risk insurance program, or the PCIP, as a stopgap until the crucial 2014 underwriting restrictions and health insurance exchanges are in place.83
78. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Secretary Sebelius
Announces New Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (July 1, 2010), http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100701a.html. Secretary Kathleen Sebelius expressed
concern that ―[f]or too long, Americans with pre-existing conditions have been locked out of
our health insurance market.‖ Id.
79. See generally Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 546 (6th Cir. 2011)
(describing medical underwriting practices); Robert H. Jerry, II, Health Insurance Coverage for High-Cost Health Care: Reflections on The Rainmaker, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1347,
1365 (1996) (describing insurance industry practices regarding pre-existing health conditions); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured:
Lessons from International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 464
(2001) (describing experience rating and its effect on premiums).
80. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-4(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
81. Id. § 300gg(a)(1).
82. Id. § 300gg-4(a).
83. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH REFORM: QUESTIONS
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The PCIP was to be in place no later than ninety days after the
ACA‘s enactment84 and guarantees coverage to individuals who
have a pre-existing condition and have been uninsured for six
months.85
The ACA placed primary responsibility on the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (―HHS‖), Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, to implement the PCIP but gave her the option of contracting with states and nonprofit organizations to assist.86 Accordingly, Secretary Sebelius invited states to cooperate with the federal
government in establishing and administering the state-based
PCIPs.87 Twenty-seven states elected to operate their own PCIPs
and receive federal funding.88 Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia declined the Secretary‘s offer and allowed the
89
federal government to administer the PCIPs in their borders.
The ultimate federal-state equilibrium did not easily fall into
place, however. Immediately following the ACA‘s enactment, several states took advantage of the Secretary‘s invitation by noisily
refusing any cooperation with the federal government in implementing the ACA.90 Eighteen months later, the rancor died down,
and the near even split of federal and state PCIPs seems to operate without debilitating federalism friction. The greatest concern
and surprise about the PCIPs has been the relatively low uptake
by potential beneficiaries. Four months after implementation, enrollment numbers nationwide remained below 8,000,91 perhaps

TEMPORARY HIGH-RISK POOL 1 (2011); Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Health &
Human Servs., supra note 78.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
85. Id. § 18001(c)–(d). See generally Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan Program,
75 Fed. Reg. 45,014, 45,015, 45,019–20 (proposed July 30, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 152) (The CIP programs ―offer [high-risk] individuals guaranteed access to coverage
without pre-existing condition exclusion at a standard premium, if they are uninsured for
at least six months.‖).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
87. See Sebelius Begins Push for High-Risk Pools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, http://pre
scriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/sebelius-begins-push-for-high-risk-pools/.
88. State by State Enrollment in the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan as of Aug.
31, 2011, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/10/pcip10142
011a.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Enrollment].
89. Id.
90. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 141–43 (describing early objections).
91. State by State Enrollment in the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan Archived
Enrollment Data, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/02/
pcip02102011b.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2012); see also Arthur Delaney, PCIP: Enrollment in High-Risk Pools Inches Up to 12,000, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2011, 12:01
ABOUT THE
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due to the public‘s lack of awareness of the program and strict eligibility rules. But according to the government‘s August 31, 2011
report, enrollment had exceeded 30,000 individuals.92
States‘ decisions whether to cooperate with PCIP implementation does not correspond to their litigant and non-litigant status.
Among the twenty-eight states suing the federal government over
the constitutionality of the ACA, thirteen elected to operate statebased PCIPs, and fifteen allowed the federal government to operate their PCIPs.93 It may seem anomalous for litigant states, urging the importance of limiting federal power and reclaiming state
power in their litigation posture, to prefer fully federal operation
of intrastate insurance pools. As a structural matter, however,
there is no apparent constitutional problem with parallel statefederal operation of PCIPs. In my earlier article, I characterized
the emerging PCIP dynamic as an example of functional federalism.94 States have the right not to be commandeered into federal
service but may voluntarily bargain and contract for use of their
services.95 Accordingly, a bare majority of states accepted the federal offer while the rest declined. Thus far, the functional federalism approach to the PCIP administration has not impaired federal-state relations and has produced a workable (albeit
undersubscribed) temporary solution for covering previously uninsurable individuals.
C. Exchanges
The experience of federal-state cooperation in the PCIP should
provide useful lessons for the implementation of Health Benefit
96
Exchanges, an intricate set of the ACA provisions that are more

PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/pcip-enrollment-in-high-risk-pools-inchesup_n_821871.html (noting that PCIP program has had a slow start).
92. Enrollment, supra note 88; see also Enrollment Tops 30,000 in Health Reform’s
Temporary High-Risk Pool, CCH (Oct. 4, 2011), http://hr.cch.com/news/benefits/100411.
asp.
93. See Enrollment, supra note 88; Ilya Somin, Number of States Challenging the Constitutionality of Obamacare Rises to 28, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 19, 2011, 2:45
AM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/19/number-of-states-challenging-the-constitutionality-of-o
bamacare-rises-to-28/; 26 States Join Suit Against Obama Health Law, FOXNEWS (Jan. 19,
2011), http://foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/18/states-join-obama-health-care-law suit-fla/.
94. Leonard, supra note 4, at 143–44.
95. See Hills, supra note 8, at 816–17 (describing the ―functional‖ theory of cooperative federalism).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
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expansive, longer lasting, and more critical to the ACA‘s overall
success than the PCIP. The ACA aims to reduce the percentage of
uninsured Americans to single digits97 through expansion of three
existing channels: (1) employer-sponsored health insurance, (2)
public health insurance (primarily Medicaid), and (3) the individual and small group health insurance market.98 The exchanges
are the linchpin to expanding the individual and small group
markets and will house a variety of regulatory structures and
substantive requirements making it economically feasible for insurers to offer meaningful, affordable products.99
The PCIP and exchanges both leave states a clear option to refuse cooperation with the federal government, thereby shielding
100
those programs from ―commandeering‖ challenges.
The PCIP
operates from the baseline of state autonomy, with the federal
government having the option to purchase states‘ administrative
services.101 By contrast, the ACA places primary responsibility for
establishing and administering exchanges on states, with the
threat of a federal take-over if they do not.102 States have until
January 1, 2013 to demonstrate to the Secretary of HHS that

97. See Elmendorf, supra note 76 (predicting that by 2019 under ACA, the insured
share of nonelderly population will be 92%, or 95%, excluding unauthorized immigrants).
98. See Barry R. Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy: The Act of Politics . . . and
Persistence, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEG‘S & PUB. POL‘Y 445, 445–56 (2011).
99. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1755–56 (2011) (describing exchanges as ―a
central feature‖ of insurance market reforms that ―will promote transparency for consumers‖); Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241,
284–93 (2010–2011) (describing the operation of exchanges); see also Creating a New
Competitive Marketplace: Health Insurance Exchange Establishment Grants Awards List,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/05/exchanges0523201
1a.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Creating a New Competitive Marketplace] (describing anticipated effects of exchanges on individual and small group insurance
markets).
100. Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–12 (1987) (upholding a federal
law conditioning federal highway funds on states enacting laws limiting alcohol sales to
minors and introducing limits on conditional spending power), and Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm‘n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (recognizing that the Tenth Amendment does not
forbid Congress from ―fix[ing] the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall
be disbursed‖), with Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that federal
commandeering of state officials violated the Constitution), and New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144. 174–75 (1992) (holding that congressional conditions ―crossed the
line distinguishing encouragement from coercion‖).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
102. Id. § 18031(b)(1) (providing that ―[e]ach State shall, not later than January 1,
2014, establish an American Health Benefit Exchange‖); see Leonard, supra note 4, at
144–45 (describing different baselines for the PCIP and exchanges).
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they will have fully operational exchanges up and running in
January 2014.103 The ACA authorizes the Secretary to provide
grants to states for exchange implementation until January 1,
2015,104 after which time, state exchanges must be selfsustaining.105 If states cannot or will not establish exchanges, the
federal government will step in and do so for them.106 In other
words, the exchanges allocate federal-state authority as a matter
of federal preemption, rather than as autonomous contracting
parties.
Should states opt to establish state-based exchanges under the
ACA, they must provide themselves with the necessary legal authority.107 At present, over one-third of states have enacted state
legislation to establish exchanges, and several others, by legislation or executive order, are continuing to study the feasibility of
establishing state-based exchanges.108 All but one of these states
accepted modest federal Exchange Planning Grants of up to $1
million to investigate and research options for creating exchanges.109 Six states and one consortium of states received substantial
Early Innovator Grants, ranging from $6 million to $48 million,
to develop information technology systems to support the exchanges.110 Ideally, innovator states will develop strategies that
other states can later adopt.111 In January 2011, HHS also announced the availability of Exchange Establishment Grants,
which several states subsequently received.112

103. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,867 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codified 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–56) (describing the ACA provisions on exchanges).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 2010).
105. Id. § 18031(d)(5)(A).
106. Id. § 18041(c)(1).
107. Sara R. Collins & Tracy Garber, State Health Insurance Exchange Legislation: A
Progress Report, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.common
wealthfund.org/Blog/2011/Jun/State-Health-Insurance-Exchange-legislation.aspx.
108. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ESTABLISHING HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES:
AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS, FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM 1–2 tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter
KFF UPDATE]; Collins & Garber, supra note 107.
109. KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 7.
110. States Leading the Way on Implementation: HHS Awards “Early Innovator”
Grants to Seven States, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/20
11/02/exchanges02162011a.html (last updated May 7, 2011) [hereinafter States Leading
the Way].
111. Id.; see also KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 7.
112. KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 8; Creating a New Competitive Marketplace, supra note 99.
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In August 2011, federal officials concluded that ―the vast majority of states have already taken the crucial early steps‖ in establishing state-based exchanges and ―have already expressed interest in applying to future [funding] rounds to build a robust
Exchange for their residents.‖113 The federal government‘s optimism, however, may be overstated. Roughly the same number of
states that enacted or intend to enact state-based exchanges considered, but failed to enact, state exchange legislation by July
2011.114 Governors in eight states where legislation failed are considering alternative ways of establishing exchanges in the face of
legislative resistance.115 Ten other states had not considered legis116
lation even with the January 2013 deadline looming.
For a time, many states participating in lawsuits challenging
the ACA‘s constitutionality continued preparations to establish
state-based exchanges. Close to half of the twenty-eight litigant
states, including Virginia, have enacted legislation or are actively
117
studying the feasibility of state-based exchanges. Several also
applied for and received generous federal grants, beyond the routine Exchanges Planning Grants. Plaintiff states Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin were awarded generous Early Innovator
Grants for approximately $31.5, $54, and $38 million, respectively.118 Several months later, however, the Republican governors of
Kansas and Oklahoma issued prominent statements returning
the grants to the federal government.119 Wisconsin‘s governor also
made a show of returning $9 million in federal grants, but not the
113. Creating a New Competitive Marketplace, supra note 99.
114. See KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 3 (noting that ―there was no [state] legislative activity on exchanges in 26 states, as of July 2011‖).
115. Collins & Garber, supra note 107.
116. Id.
117. See id. (including a map showing the ―Status of State Legislation to Establish Exchanges, as of January 2012‖); see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., State Action Toward Creating Health Insurance Exchanges as of Dec. 22, 2011, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=962&cat=17&sub=205&yr=1&typ=
5&o=a&sortc=1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
118. States Leading the Way, supra note 110.
119. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Total Health Insurance Exchange Grants, 2011,
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=964&cat
=17&sub=205&yr=200&typ=4 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter KFF, Exchange
Grants] (noting return of grants); Isabel Lyman, Okla. Gov. Fallin Rejects Federal Grant
for Health Insurance Exchange, THE NEW AM. (Apr. 17, 2011), http://thenewamerican.
com/usnews/health-care/150-okla-gov-fallin-rejects-federal-grant-for-state-health-insuranc
e-exchange; Scott Rothschild, Brownback Says State Is Returning to Feds $31.5 Million
Health Care Reform, GRANT LAWRENCE J. WORLD (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www2.ljworld.com
/news/2011/aug/09/brownback-says-state-returning-feds-315-million-he/.
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full $38 million Early Innovator Grant.120 Only three litigant
states—Alaska, Florida, and Louisiana—have refused all federal
funding related to exchange implementation.121
The range of state responses to the January 2013 exchange
deadline reveals alternate federalism values and approaches.
Some states, having failed to prevent the ACA from being enacted, are pursuing a second-best strategy of preventing it from being effectively implemented by blocking state exchange legislation
and refusing federal financial assistance. That obstinacy effectively cedes control of exchanges to the federal government, a
move that contradicts the federalism rhetoric of states‘ rights and
limited federal powers. One Montana legislator, who opposes the
ACA and also sought to block state exchange legislation, explained that as long as a state-based exchange is established under the federal ―mandate,‖ there is ―nothing Montana-made about
it.‖122 Alaska‘s governor Sean Parnell offered a different rationale,
citing Senior District Court Judge Roger Vinson‘s opinion striking
down the ACA as the ―law of the land.‖123 In Parnell‘s mind, any
steps toward implementing exchanges would be ―proceed[ing]
124
down an unlawful course,‖ despite the fact that Judge Vinson‘s

120. Igor Volsky, Scott Walker Cuts State Health Services, Then Rejects Health Reform’s Public Health Grants, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011, 12:08 PM), http://think
progress.org/health/2011/08/05/289193/wisconsin-rejects-grants-from-health-law-despitecutting-health-services-in-state-budget/; see also Sarah Kliff, Will Wisconsin’s Scott Walker
Implement Health-Care Reform?, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/ezraklein/post/willwisconsinsscottwalkerimplementhealthcarereform/2011/07/11
/glQALBOb8l_blog.html.
121. See Kevin Sack, Opposing the Health Law, Florida Refuses Millions of Dollars,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, at A10; KFF, Exchange Grants, supra note 119 (summarizing
total federal grants to states and noting those three states did not receive a federal grant);
Yereth Rosen, Alaska Won’t Seek U.S. Health Exchange Grants, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/us-alaska-healthcare-idUSTRE71H0UC201102
18.
122. Sarah Kliff, Tea Party Notches Health Reform Wins, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2011, 1:32
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52231.html. Discussing the resistance establishing state-based exchanges, Michael Cannon, director of health policy studies at the
Cato Institute, stated that ―[t]here remains an inherent contradiction where you have governors saying they think Obamacare is unconstitutional but [are] also trying to implement
the law.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Althea Fung, Alaska Governor Refusing to Apply for Exchange Grants, NAT‘L J.
(Feb. 18, 2011), www.nationaljournal.com/member/healthcare/alaska-governor-refusing-toapply-for-exchange-grants-2011-2-18?mrefid=site_search (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1304–05 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 648 F. 3d 1235
(11th Cir. 2011)).
124. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
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decision was binding only in the Northern District of Florida and
only until overturned by the Eleventh Circuit.125
Other states have followed a more pragmatic strategy of simultaneously challenging the constitutionality of the ACA while taking affirmative steps toward establishing state-based exchanges,
thus hedging their bets in the event that the lawsuits are unsuccessful. The preference for state-based, rather than federally operated, exchanges strikes a more consistent ideological posture
regarding states‘ traditional powers to regulate health care and
health insurance under the Tenth Amendment. To that end, Oklahoma‘s governor and legislative leaders plan to move forward
with establishing a state-based exchange solely with state and
126
private dollars. Similarly, Colorado has touted its bipartisan
health insurance exchange and decision not to opt out of the ACA
implementation.127 Wisconsin applied for its Early Innovator
Grant128 under former Democratic Governor Jim Doyle, holding
itself out as technical expert and leader for state-based health
care programs.129 Even under the current Republican governor,
Wisconsin has not returned the Early Innovator Grant and maintains a prototype Wisconsin Health Insurance Exchange website.130
The lack of a unified response to exchanges implementation
among states opposing the ACA suggests the array of values that
federalism encompasses, more than incoherence in states‘ strategies. Like the PCIP implementation, states‘ litigation postures do
not necessarily align with their varying preferences for exchange
implementation. Yet both the pragmatic and obstinate strategies
are grounded in the federalism rhetoric. Some states take offense
at any federal requirements being imposed on states and, there125. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1304–05 (striking down the ACA
in its entirety after finding the individual mandate unconstitutional); 648 F.3d at 1323
(holding that the district court erred in invalidating the ACA).
126. See Lyman, supra note 119 (―The intent is to satisfy ObamaCare‘s requirement of
establishing an exchange, and do it with state and private dollars.‖).
127. Nancy Lofholm, Colorado Stands Against Anti-Health-Reform Tide, DENV. POST,
Nov. 3, 2010, at B2.
128. Wisconsin a Model for Creating Healthcare Insurance Exchanges, ALTER CARE
BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.altergroup.com/alter-care-blog/index.php/hea
lthcare/wisconsin-a-model-for-creating-healthcare-insurance-exchanges/.
129. Id.
130. See generally WISCONSIN HEALTH INS. EXCHANGE, https://exchange.Wiscon sin.gov
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (proving information regarding the Wisconsin Health Insurance Exchange).
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fore, refuse any cooperation with exchange implementation.131
Other states appear more troubled by the notion of federal authorities taking over state functions and, therefore, take steps to
ensure state control of exchanges and avoid federal preemption.132
The intermingling of federal and state exchange implementation demonstrates familiar federalism values of voice, diversity,
and exit.133 Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, states are exploring alternative funding, legislation, and coordination strategies. States may satisfy diverse tastes and priorities through a
choice of fully federal, fully state, or cooperative federal-state
strategies.134 Indeed, the choice between a national exchange and
state-based exchanges was exhaustively vetted through the political process in congressional debates, with the latter carrying the
135
final vote. Critics of state-based exchanges nevertheless raise
practical concerns about some states‘ risk pools being too small
for exchanges to operate effectively and the qualified success of
136
existing pre-ACA state exchanges. More to the point of this essay, commentators fault the ―state-centric framework‖ for creating an ongoing opportunity for states to obstruct implementation
137
and perpetuate political battles. The preceding description undoubtedly confirms that dynamic but does not compel the normative conclusion that it necessarily is a bad thing. That sort of friction and jarring, which ―promot[ed] deliberation and circumspection,‖ was part of the Framers‘ design.138 Although the system
of health insurance exchanges ultimately implemented by the
states and the federal government may be different from

131. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 112–13, 134; Kliff, supra, note 122.
132. See Bailey McCann, Nebraska, Ohio Push Forward on Insurance Exchanges Despite Opposition, CIVSOURCE (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.civsourceonline.com/2012/01/06/
nebraska_ohio_push_forward_on_insurance_exchanges_despite_opposition/.
133. See Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 276–78; see also Leonard, supra note 4, at
121 & nn.57–59 (providing further discussion on the values of voice, diversity, and exitrights).
134. See Adler, supra note 9, at 203–07 (emphasizing the importance of matching policies with local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions).
135. Leonard, supra note 4, at 145. Compare America‘s Affordable Health Choices Act
of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 208(a)–(b) (2009) (discussing the federal requirements
states must meet to opt-in and operate their own exchanges), with Affordable Health
Choice Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. §§ 3105(a), 3106(e)(1)–(2) (2009) (enacted) (creating a
state-based exchange).
136. Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 293–94.
137. Id. at 291–92.
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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Congress‘s vision or single-payer adherents‘ preferences, at least
it will be a system with which most participants can live.139
It remains to be seen how credible the federal government‘s
preemption threat will be in the face of pervasive state resistance.140 If the federal government cannot marshal sufficient
financial and administrative resources to overcome states‘ resistance to implementing exchanges, the response could threaten
the overall success of the ACA. Or, states‘ uncooperativeness
could force a change in policy.141 But if state-based and federally
operated exchanges can comfortably coexist as ―marble cake‖ alternatives,142 like the PCIP, then state resistance may have little
effect in altering the path of federal health reform.
D. Federal Insurance Market Regulations
In my previous article, I included the ACA‘s federal health insurance market regulations among the targets of state re143
sistance. The lack of resistance to the ACA‘s significant reallocation of authority to the federal government to regulate in an
area of traditional state concern was particularly notable.144
Health care and health insurance regulation has long been the
primary domain of states.145 The federal government‘s previous
139. See Adler, supra note 9, at 202–03 (noting that ―among competing values and interests for which there is no single ‗right‘ answer . . . a decentralized system will result in
greater net satisfaction of individual policy preferences than will a uniform federal system‖).
140. Hills, supra note 8, at 868 (describing the federal-state dynamics of conditional
preemption and noting that ―Congress is constrained by its limited regulatory capacity . . .
[and] cannot obtain the condition unless it can make a credible threat of preemption‖).
141. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 8, at 1266–67 (―One main source of the
servant‘s power is dependence, [and] . . . . [s]tates similarly wield power against a federal
government that depends on them to administer its programs.‖).
142. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES, Part II, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1984) (1966) (discussing ―layer
cake‖ and ―marble cake‖ federalism models).
143. Leonard, supra note 4, at 150–55.
144. See id.; see also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1302–07 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding insurance and health care to be
areas of traditional state concern).
145. Id. at 1305; Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 619, 644 (1994) (―[B]efore ERISA state law was viewed as the primary source of
standards for plans.‖); Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 88, 89 (2009)
(―Traditionally, states are responsible for regulating health care delivery, and litigation
against health care providers is resolved under state law.‖); Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D.
Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-
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intrusion into health insurance regulation, specifically directed at
employer-based health insurance plans through the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (―ERISA‖),146 is largely an
empty letter in terms of real, substantive regulation.147 ERISA infringes on state authority by broadly preempting affirmative
state regulation of employer health insurance but imposes few
specific requirements on health plans, much less on states.148 The
ACA, by contrast, adds an extensive new overlay of federal regulations applicable to employer-based health insurance plans as
well as individual and small group plans, which historically were
regulated by states.149 The ACA‘s health insurance market regulations apply uniformly nationwide, thus limiting the space for
state variation. States may continue to regulate health insurance
plans and health insurers as long as state laws supplement and
do not conflict with the ACA.150
Many of the new federal health insurance regulations have
151
broad popular support and are aimed at some of the most objectionable practices by commercial insurers, including pre-existing
condition exclusions,152 premium discrimination,153 post-claims
154
underwriting and rescission and annual and lifetime benefits
155
caps. New federal laws that prohibit or severely limit those
practices take effect in 2014, the same effective date as the ex-

Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 33 (1999) (noting that
states‘ inherent police powers include the authority to regulate insurance).
146. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(2006) (providing that federal law preempts ―any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan‖); see also id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (providing a civil action as the exclusive remedy for benefits disputes).
147. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 23, 29 (2001) (―The result of this statutory
framework is to leave employment-based health insurance effectively unregulated, since
ERISA contains no substantive regulation of health benefits.‖); Jacobson, supra note 145,
at 89 (noting that ERISA provides ―minimal federal regulation‖).
148. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 147; Leonard, supra note 4, at 152–53.
149. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1884–87
(2011).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (Supp. IV 2010) (―Nothing in this title shall be construed
to preempt any state law that does not prevent the application of this title.‖).
151. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE—A BRIEF
HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS IN THE U.S. 1 (2009).
152. 42 § U.S.C. 300gg-1 (Supp. IV 2010)
153. Id. § 300gg.
154. Id. § 300gg-12.
155. Id. § 300gg-11.
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changes and the individual mandate.156 Other coverage and underwriting requirements, including the ban on pre-existing condition exclusions for children,157 extension of dependent child coverage up to age twenty-six,158 and coverage of preventive services
without cost-sharing,159 took effect in 2011.160 The ACA also attempts to rein in insurance companies‘ excess profits, executive
compensation, and other largess by limiting non-medical, administrative expenditures to specified percentages of premium revenues.161 This so-called Medical-Loss Ratio (the ―MLR‖) provision
also took effect in 2011.162
Given the popularity of those reforms among the general public,163 it is not surprising that ACA opponents have not expended
much political capital fighting them. But as a structural matter,
the lack of resistance to federal health insurance market regulation seems inconsistent with states‘ objection to the expansion of
federal power and intrusion on areas of traditional state authority. As 2014 nears, states have begun to gently push back against
uniform federal standards and requirements, seeking to tailor
certain insurance regulations to their particular markets. So far,
states have not taken the Obama Administration‘s invitation to
opt out of the ACA‘s insurance market regulations entirely and
design unique, state-specific approaches.164
The only significant state resistance to federal health insurance regulation has come in the form of requests for waivers from
the MLR. Effective January 2011, health insurers are required to
meet certain MLR targets.165 Insurance companies must spend

156. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.
158. Id. § 300gg-14.
159. Id. § 300gg-13.
160. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 300-18.
162. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12.
163. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW POPULAR IS THE IDEA OF REPEALING
HEALTH REFORM? 2–3 (2010) (describing polling results revealing that even among respondents who favor repealing ACA, many favor keeping particular provisions, including
guaranteed issue, the PCIP, dependent child coverage, and exchanges); Reed Abelson et
al., Major Changes in Health Care Likely to Last, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A1 (noting
provisions of health reform that ―are already well cemented and popular‖).
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Supp. IV 2010) (―Waiver for State Innovation‖); Application, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,553
(proposed Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 33 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 155).
165. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12.
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80% (in the individual and small group market) or 85% (in the
large group market) of premiums on direct patient care and quality improvement.166 Only 15% or 20%, of premium revenues, depending on the market, may be spent on non-claims costs, including administrative expenses, overhead, executive salaries, and
marketing.167 Health plans that do not meet the targets must provide rebates to their customers, effective January 1, 2012.168
Several state insurance commissioners expressed concern
about the effect of the MLR on local markets. In particular,
smaller insurance companies might have difficulty meeting the
20% requirement as quickly as the ACA required, which could
cause those companies to stop offering policies or leave the mar169
ket altogether. Alternatively, insurers might try to comply with
the MLR targets by decreasing brokers‘ commissions, thereby
causing brokers to leave the market.170 In either case, the effect
would undermine the availability of insurance, contrary to the
ACA‘s goal of expanding health insurance coverage. In response,
the Secretary of HHS adopted a regulation allowing states to request waivers from the MLR ―if there is a reasonable likelihood
that application of the requirement‖ will destabilize the individual health insurance market in the state.171 Seventeen states, including several litigant states, requested MLR waivers, ranging
172
from 65% to 75%. The Secretary approved, with modifications,

166. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Dep‘t of Health &
Human Servs., Health Insurance Issues Implementing Medical-Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 74,864, 74,901 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 300-gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
168. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A); Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 74,883.
169. Carrie Teegardin, Feds Give Georgia Insurers More Time to Comply with Health
Care Law, ATLANTA-J. CONST., Nov. 9, 2011, at A1; Karoun Demirjian, Nevada Secures
Partial Waiver from Federal Health Care Law, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 16, 2011), http://
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/may/16/nevada-secures-partial-waiver-federal-healthcare-/; Jason Millman, Another State Wants Healthcare Reform Waiver, THE HILL (Mar.
19, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/
150819-another-state-wants-health-reform-waiver; Margaret Dick Tocknell, Understanding MLR Waiver Requests, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (Jul. 27, 2011), http://www.healthlead
ersmedia.com/content/HEP-269094/Understanding-MLR-Waiver-Requests.html.
170. See Jonathan Block, GAO: Insurers Cut Broker Commissions to Comply with Medical Loss Ratio Rules, AIS HEALTH (Sept. 5, 2011), http://aishealth.com/archive/nhpw
090511-02.
171. 45 C.F.R. § 158.301 (2011).
172. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Medical Loss Ratio Adjustments, 2011,
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six states‘ waivers for 2011, including four litigant states.173 Resisting states tout those ―partial waivers‖ from the ACA as incremental victories in an overall strategy of undermining the federal reforms.174
The ACA allows much broader state waivers from ―all or any
requirements‖ of significant portions of the statute, including the
individual mandate, health insurance exchange implementation,
employer penalties, essential health benefits, and the obligation
to distribute federal subsidies for individuals and tax credits for
businesses to help purchase insurance.175 Section 1332 waivers
are available beginning January 1, 2017176 and are subject to the
Secretary‘s approval.177 Less than a year after the ACA was enacted, President Obama endorsed a bipartisan amendment that
would fast-track Section 1332 waivers three years earlier, allowing states to obtain waivers as soon as January 1, 2014.178 The
President touted the Section 1332 waiver provision and his support for a shorter timeframe in his February 2011 address to the
National Governors Association.179 So far, however, only a few
states—and no litigant states—have submitted such proposals.
The most prominent Section 1332 proposal came from Vermont in
STATEHEALTHCAREFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=90&
cat=17 (listing Georgia, Iowa, Maine, and Nevada) (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
173. Id.
174. See Demirjian, supra note 169 (noting that Republicans claim waiver ―as a political victory‖ and ―fresh fodder for an acrimonious debate about health care‖).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Supp. IV 2010).
176. Id. § 18052(a).
177. Id. § 18052(a)(1)–(2) (listing the ACA requirements subject to waiver); see Katherine Hayes & Sara Rosenbaum, Waivers for State Innovation, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Mar.
21, 2011), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/waivers-for-state-innovation/ (listing
the essential health benefit requirement, exchanges, premium assistance, employer responsibility, and the individual mandate among waivable requirements).
178. Sarah Kliff, Some States Seek Flexibility to Push Health-Care Overhaul Further,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, at A3; Meredith Hughes, Health Reform Flexibility and the
Wyden-Brown Waiver for State Innovation, BIPARTISAN POL‘Y CTR. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://
www.bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/2011/03/health-reform-flexibility-and-wyden-brown-waiverstate-innovation; Preparing for Innovation: Proposed Process for States to Adopt Innovative
Strategies to Meet the Goals of the Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.hea
lthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/03/stateinnovation03102011a.html (last updated Nov.
16, 2011) [hereinafter Preparing for Innovation].
179. Press Release, Bernie Sanders, U.S. Senator for Vt., President Endorses State
Waiver Proposal (Feb. 28, 2011), http://sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=44a664de8e92-43f4-a871-d26e0b5a252d; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack, Altering Stand on
Health Law, Obama Offers Waiver Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A1; see also Preparing for Innovation (describing proposed waiver regulations as ―[b]uilding on President
Obama‘s commitment to give states the flexibility to innovate and implement health care
solutions that work best for them‖).
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May 2011.180 Its state legislature approved a single-payer health
plan for the state and is working with the federal government to
obtain necessary waivers.181 Other states, including Oregon and
Montana, have indicated intent to apply for more modest waivers
to overhaul physician payment and to allow public employees to
enroll in Medicaid.182
The ACA‘s invitation for broad state flexibility has been
spurned by some of the most vocal opponents of federal health reform. Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin charged that the federal
requirements to receive a waiver are too onerous.183 Kansas Governor Sam Brownback said that flexibility ―is a positive thing‖
but ―doesn‘t change the overall objection to the bill.‖184 Senator
185
Orrin Hatch of Utah calls the waiver provision a ―gimmick.‖
South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley vowed to start crunching
numbers to come up with a waiver proposal, concluding, ―This is
about saying we‘re going to fight this every step of the way and
186
use every option possible.‖ Thus far, however, no South Carolina Section 1332 proposal has materialized.187 Implementing regulations specify that states may qualify for Section 1332 waivers
only if they can demonstrate their waiver plans will be ―at least
as comprehensive‖ as the exchanges with ―coverage and cost sharing protections‖ that are ―as least as affordable‖ as the ACA.188
States also must demonstrate their plans ―will provide coverage
to at least a comparable number of [state] residents‖ as the ACA

180. Kliff, supra note 178.
181. Id.; see also Press Release, Bernie Sanders, supra note 179.
182. Governors Push the Limits of Health Reform: Innovate State Leaders Hit Roadblock with Health Reform Waivers, THE DAILY BRIEFING (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.advi
sory.com/Daily-Briefing/2011/10/18/Democratic-governors.
183. See Hughes, supra note 178.
184. KHI News Service, Obama Tells Governors He Backs Accelerated State Flexibility
for Health Reform, KAN. HEALTH INST. (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.khi.org/news/2011/feb/
28/obama-tells-governors-he-backs-accelerated-state-f/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. See Hughes, supra note 178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Seanna Adcox, Haley: Obama Might Let South Carolina Opt Out of Health Care,
POST & COURIER (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2010/dec/02/haleyobama-might-let-sc-opt-out-of-health-care/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Cf. THE DAILY BRIEFING, supra note 182 (listing Democratic governors who have
proposed Section 1332 waivers).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A)–(B) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Application, Review, and
Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,553, 13,561 (proposed
Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 33.108(a)(2)(iv)(C)(1), (4)) (listing and explaining the application conditions).
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and ―will not increase the Federal Deficit.‖189 In effect, states may
obtain waivers only if they can develop their own strategies to
achieve the same coverage, consumer protection, and costcontainment goals as the comprehensive federal legislation.
States‘ relatively modest objections to a new swath of federal
insurance market regulations and their unwillingness to innovate
fully state-based solutions suggests federalism ambivalence. The
ACA imposes a thick overlay of new federal rules and standards
for health insurance plans, including small group and individual
plans that traditionally have been regulated by states.190 Despite
the expansion of federal authority into state domain, states seem
disinclined to challenge new federal laws that have broad popular
appeal. States seeking modest MLR waivers cite policy objectives
consistent with the ACA, namely ensuring access to health insurance in certain markets.191 No litigant states have proposed comprehensive state innovation under the ACA Section 1332 waiv192
ers. The ACA‘s goals of providing near universal access to
meaningful health insurance coverage and high-quality health
care while containing escalating health care costs are daunting.
States are understandably reluctant to attempt similar broad reform without federal involvement. National regulation of health
insurance offers advantages of scale, uniformity, spillover avoid193
ance, and redistribution. Insurance markets present unique collective action problems that may not be well-suited for state-by194
state regulation. Although opposing expansion of federal au-

189. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(C)–(D) (Supp. IV 2010); Application, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,561.
190. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text.
191. Letter from Jane L. Cline, President, Nat‘l Ass‘n Ins. Comm‘rs, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec‘y Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.Naic.
org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf.
192. Cf. THE DAILY BRIEFING, supra note 182.
193. See Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 271–72 (noting the lower per-unit cost of
regulation at the national level, ease of compliance for companies operating in more than
one state, avoidance of regulatory distortion, and redistribution of resources among
states).
194. See Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT 591, 605–08 (2011) (discussing free rider and adverse
selection problems in insurance markets that spill over state boundaries and thereby justify federal regulation); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform,
YALE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 22–26), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856506 (listing citizens‘ concerns about travel and
mobility, imposition of unequal financial burdens on states, and race to the bottom concerns with individual state regulation of insurance).
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thority in principle, states may pragmatically recognize that, for
particular problems, centralized solutions may better achieve the
interests and aims of their citizenry.
The fact that the ACA opponents are nuanced enough to recognize that federal regulation offers certain advantages and do not
feel compelled to fall on their state autonomy sword reveals a
strength rather than a weakness of ―muddled‖ federalism. The
problems facing the U.S. health care system are complex and
multifaceted. There is no reason to expect that either an allfederal or all-state-based approach would achieve the entire
range of objectives. The federalist structure, by design, allows
that some problems are best addressed centrally while others are
better suited to local solutions.
E. Individual Mandate
The centerpiece of state-based dissent to federal health reform
continues to be the ACA‘s ―minimum essential coverage‖ requirement, better known as the individual mandate.195 Before the
ACA was passed, over forty state legislatures entertained Health
Care Freedom Acts (―HCFAs‖) purporting to protect their citizens
and residents from any requirement to purchase or maintain individual health insurance.196 Twenty-eight states are parties to
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the individual man197
date. Even after the ACA‘s enactment, state legislators continue
to introduce HCFAs and similar legislation or constitutional
amendments,198 despite the undeniable federal supremacy of the
ACA. Another novel strategy used by the ACA opponents is the

195. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring every U.S. citizen, other than those
falling within specified exceptions, maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage for each month beginning in 2014); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010) (imposing a federal tax penalty for noncompliance).
196. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 113–15, 159.
197. Lyle Denniston, Health Care Case Advances in Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19,
2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/health-care-case-advances-in-court/;
see also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235 (11th Cir. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011);
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No.
611-cv-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Oklahoma ex rel.
Pruitt].
198. See Cauchi, supra note 25.
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proposal of interstate health compacts,199 as if states could agree
among themselves to override conflicting federal law.
1. Litigation Posture
The individual mandate, above all other fronts of the ACA resistance, is the states‘ rights rallying cry, despite the provision‘s
tangential connection with federal-state allocation of power. The
individual mandate requires nothing of states.200 It is enacted under federal law, carries a federal tax penalty for noncompliance,201
and will be enforced by federal authorities.202 To be sure, there are
plausible individual rights objections to the requirement to purchase health insurance from a private company, including interference with autonomous health care decision making and freedom of contract. But those claims, even if judicially cognizable,
would garner only low-level rational relation scrutiny, which the
individual mandate could likely withstand.203
Instead, the strongest constitutional argument against the individual mandate is structural, not substantive. Both individual
and state litigants have alleged that the individual mandate exceeds the scope of federally enumerated powers, namely the tax204
ing and commerce powers. The Commerce Clause challenge, in
particular, directly tests the limits of enumerated federal powers
against states‘ reserved Tenth Amendment powers. The lawsuits
allege that an individual‘s lack of health insurance does not con-

199. See Some States Pursue Health Compacts, Affordable CARE ACT: ST. ACTION NEWS
(Nat‘l Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), June 3, 2011, at 2.
200. Health insurance exchanges are required to certify individuals as exempt from the
individual mandate. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(H) (Supp. IV 2010). Accordingly, if states
elect to operate their own exchanges, they would be required to perform that function.
201. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing federal income tax penalty).
202. Id. § 5000A(g) (specifying federal enforcement).
203. See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (Special Supplement) 38, 44–47 (2009) (considering the individual rights claims); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the Extension of Structural Protection to Non-Fundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4–6) (explaining ―that, in most scholars‘ view, the
individual mandate simply does not infringe liberty—at least not in any constitutionally
meaningful way‖ and considering and dismissing various other arguments).
204. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235, 1282, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011) (addressing the commerce power and taxing power
claims); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 540 (6th Cir. 2011) (addressing
commerce power claim); Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, ___ F.3d ___, 2011
WL 3962915, at *5 (4th Cir. 2011) (addressing the tax power claim).
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stitute an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce205 and that the federal government cannot compel the purchase of health insurance.206 The cases are poised for Supreme
Court review, with circuit splits on both substantive and procedural grounds. The Eleventh Circuit held the individual mandate
unconstitutional on both taxing and commerce grounds,207 while
the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit upheld the mandate as a
valid exercise of federal commerce power.208 The Supreme Court
almost surely will resolve the merits of the constitutionality of
the individual mandate during the 2012 term.
Procedurally, a question in the lower courts was whether states
have standing to challenge the individual mandate, that is,
whether states suffer injury-in-fact as a result of the mandate‘s
209
operation. As I noted, the minimum essential coverage requirement does not call for any state implementation or hardly
any state administration.210 In what now seems a strategic mis211
calculation, Virginia, and later Oklahoma, filed separate lawsuits, apart from the other twenty-six states, asserting standing
based on the minimum essential coverage provision‘s direct con212
flict with previously enacted state HCFAs. In essence, those
states argued unique injuries to their sovereign interest in enforcing validly enacted state laws, which the ACA contravened. In my
earlier article, I agreed that Virginia would seem to have clearer
standing to challenge the individual mandate as a violation of
state sovereignty, as compared to states merely asserting an interest in protecting individual citizens‘ freedom, health, and wel-

205. See Nat‘l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) (describing the interstate character of some intrastate activities).
206. E.g., Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1285 (summarizing the plaintiffs‘
argument); Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 543 (same).
207. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. 648 F.3d at 1241.
208. Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 534; Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
209. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting federal courts‘ jurisdiction to ―cases‖ and ―controversies‖); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing three requirements for standing, including ―injury in fact‖).
210. See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text (describing operation of individual
mandate).
211. Complaint, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt, supra note 197, at 2.
212. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011); Memorandum in Support of Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, Oklahoma ex rel.
Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-cv-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt].
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fare.213 My suggestion was echoed by the American Legislative
Exchange Council‘s (―ALEC‖) playbook, The State Legislators
Guide to Repealing ObamaCare, urging states to enact HCFAs
precisely for the purpose of ―provid[ing] standing to a state participating in current litigation against the federal individual mandate.‖214
The Fourth Circuit, however, held just the opposite.215 The essence of Virginia‘s claim, according to the court, was ―to litigate
as parens patriae by asserting the rights of its citizens.‖216 The
court declined to recognize any cognizable state interest in protecting a state‘s residents from operation of a federal statute.217
Moreover, a state could not ―acquire some special stake in the relationship between its citizens and the federal government mere218
ly by memorializing its litigation posture in a statute.‖ In sum,
the Fourth Circuit held that the individual mandate implicates
individual, not state, interests and, accordingly, denied Virginia
standing to challenge the individual mandate. The U.S. government moved to dismiss the Oklahoma case on similar grounds.219
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found that case justiciable because the plaintiffs included both state and private-party plaintiffs and the challenges were to both the individual mandate and
Medicaid expansion.220 Virginia‘s go-it-alone strategy, as it turned
out, was flawed in two respects: first, it fails to include an individual litigant with a real stake in the individual health insur221
ance mandate or a Medicaid challenge, in which the state has a

213.
214.

Leonard, supra note 4, at 159.
AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, THE STATE LEGISLATORS GUIDE TO REPEALING
OBAMACARE 12 (2011) [hereinafter ALEC GUIDE].
215. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272 (holding Virginia had no standing to
challenge the individual mandate).
216. Id. at 268.
217. Id. at 270–71; see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Not So Fast—
Jurisdictional Barriers to the ACA Litigation, NEW ENG. J. MED., Oct. 20, 2011, at e34(1)–
e34(2) (noting the Fourth Circuit‘s holding as ―invoking well-settled law that states may
not sue to protect their citizens from federal law, since state citizens are also federal citizens‖).
218. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 271.
219. Memorandum, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt, supra note 212, at 8–9.
220. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011).
221. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that individual plaintiffs demonstrated actual injury by showing that impending requirements to buy health insurance changed their spending and saving habits).
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real interest.222 Second, Virginia believed that enacting a state
statute contrary to ACA could create an injury-in-fact where one
otherwise did not exist.
In sum, according to at least one federate appellate court,
states lack standing to challenge the health insurance mandate
because the real injury is to individuals, not states. On the other
hand, it is hard to see what interest individuals have in challenging the mandate on structural federalism grounds. The allegation
is that Congress acted outside the scope of its limited, enumerated powers in requiring most Americans to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage. Such a claim asserts injury to
states‘ reserved powers, not individual rights. The litigation approach of individuals challenging the validity of federal laws on
223
structural grounds is not unique to the ACA, however. Affirming the availability of such a claim, a recent Supreme Court decision expressly recognized an individual‘s standing to challenge a
federal statute, not even on a federal enumerated power, but on
states‘ Tenth Amendment reserved powers,224 noting: ―An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the
States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is
concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of fed225
eralism is not for the States alone to vindicate.‖ But the strategy does present a paradox. States may lack standing to litigate
the rights of their citizens while individuals may challenge federal infringement on states‘ rights.

222. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244 (concluding that ―the state
plaintiffs undeniably have standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions‖).
223. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2005) (Commerce Clause challenge to
Federal Controlled Substances Act raised by users and growers of marijuana); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 604 (2000) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Violence Against Women Act raised by rape defendants); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551–52 (1995) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act
brought by criminal defendant); Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Chada, 462 U.S.
919, 923, 928 (1983) (alien sought review of deportation order, challenging Federal Immigration and Nationality Act on separation of powers grounds); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970) (fruit grower challenged Arizona intrastate packing and processing requirement on dormant Commerce Clause grounds).
224. Bond v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (challenging conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 229, which forbids knowing possession or use, for nonpeaceful
purposes, of a chemical that ―can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent
harm to humans‖) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. at 2364.
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The Supreme Court will not have to reach that procedural conundrum to decide the merits of the individual mandate challenges because the Florida lawsuit, on which certiorari was
granted, does not present the standing issue. 226 Accordingly, there
may be no clarification on the question whether states may advocate for individuals‘ rights, consistent with New Federalism literature,227 or whether individuals may advocate for states‘ rights,
thereby invigorating the Tenth Amendment as an individually
cognizable claim.228 That uncertainty continues to muddle the justiciable federalism issues.229
2. State Legislation
In addition to litigation, states continue to express opposition
to the individual mandate through state legislation. Lawmakers
in at least forty-five states have introduced HCFAs or similar
proposals.230 To date, eighteen states have passed binding statutes, as well as two state constitutional amendments, opposing
231
elements of the ACA. Other states will consider resolutions in
the current legislative term or on 2012 ballot items.232 Nine states

226. See Consolidated Brief for Respondent, Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-393 & 11-400 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011);
Reply Brief for Petition, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 2011).
227. Leonard, supra note 4, at 130–31 (describing the New Federalism theory as advocating broadened recognition of individual rights by state governments and a shift in power from the federal government to states).
228. See Bond, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2366–67; Garrett Epps, U.S. v. Bond:
Reexamining the Mysterious 10th Amendment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/02/us-v-bond-reexamining-the-mysterious-10th-am
endment/71436/ (suggesting that the case offers ―oblique hints about how the Justices are
thinking about the pending health-care challenge‖); Frank Mintier, Did the Supreme
Court Tip Its Hand on ObamaCare?, AM. THINKER (June 23, 2011), http://www.ame ricanthinker.com/2011/06/did-the-supreme-court-tip-its-hand-on-obamacare.html (quoting Justice Kennedy‘s question during the Bond argument and suggesting it foreshadows ―how he
might rule on ObamaCare‖). But see Adam Liptak, Court Weighs the Power of Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, at A11 (suggesting that unique facts of Bond ―offer[s] only limited guidance on the health care law‘s prospects‖).
229. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Affordable Care Act Litigation: The
Standing Paradox, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988311 (describing lower court decisions in ACA litigation and proposing that states be accorded standing to challenge the individual mandate,
if they allege concrete, particularized injury to state interests, similar to individual plaintiffs‘ injury allegations).
230. Cauchi, supra note 25.
231. Id.
232. Id.

LEONARD 463 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

816

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

3/7/2012 1:08 PM

[Vol. 46:781

passed nonbinding resolutions or memorials.233 In 2011, the year
after the ACA was finally and validly enacted as federal law,
eight additional states introduced legislation purporting to shield
their residents from the ACA‘s requirement to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage.234
The ongoing state legislative activity in the face of obvious federal preemption is curious. Urging states to continue enacting
HCFAs, ALEC‘s playbook suggests, among other strategic effects,
that the HCFAs ―provide a state-level defense against ObamaCare‘s excessive federal power‖ and could support ―additional,
[Tenth]-Amendment-based litigation if the current lawsuits
fail.‖235 It is not clear what sort of state-level defense an obviously
preempted state law might have, or how a Tenth Amendment
challenge would fare any better than a challenge to the scope of
particular enumerated federal powers.236 More realistically,
HCFAs may simply memorialize states opinions about individual
rights and codify objection to federal health reform. It is also possible that HCFAs would reemerge as enforceable state laws,
should the ACA in its entirety, or the individual mandate, specifi237
cally, be struck down.
Even more curious is states‘ novel strategy of enacting the ―Interstate Health Care Freedom Compact‖ (the ―Compact‖).238 The
Compact includes elements of individual states‘ HCFAs but purports to operate as an agreement among states to resist federal

233. Id.
234. See id.
235. ALEC GUIDE, supra note 214, at 12.
236. The issue whether the Tenth Amendment operates as an additional limit on federal power is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (―The [Tenth] [A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered.‖); Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of
1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 167–69
(2006) (―Over a period of two hundred years, courts and commentators thus transformed
the Tenth Amendment from a declaration of principle to an independent rule of construction.‖); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth [A]mendment in Constitutional
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 470, 472 (2008) (examining the interaction between
the Tenth Amendment and federal laws).
237. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 166.
238. Some States Pursue Health Compacts, supra note 199. See generally HEALTH CARE
COMPACT, http://healthcarecompact.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter HEALTH
CARE COMPACT] (―The Health Care Compact is an interstate compact—which is simply an
agreement between two or more states that is consented to by Congress—that restores
authority and responsibility for health care regulation to the member states . . . and provides the funds to the state to fulfill that responsibility.‖).
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health reform. Three litigant states Texas,239 Oklahoma,240 and
Georgia,241 and one non-litigant state, Missouri242 have enacted the
Compact under state laws. The Compact legislation has also been
introduced in at least fourteen other states.243 Proponents and
sponsors describe the Compact as ―giv[ing] the health care decision making power back to the people instead of the bureaucrats
in Washington,‖244 ―[p]reserving [Tenth] Amendment rights so
states can move forward with true health care reform,‖245 and allowing ―each state [to] decide[] which plan is best for its citizens.‖246 They further assert that compacts are neither ―radical‖
nor unprecedented but simply ―tools to allow states to solve prob247
lems together.‖ Broadly, Compact authorizes member states to
―suspend by legislation the operation of all federal laws, rules,
regulations, and orders regarding Health Care that are inconsistent with the laws and regulations adopted by the Member
State pursuant to this Compact.‖248 Further, the Compact purports to entitle states to receive federal block grants and prohibits
such funding from being ―conditional on any action of or regulation, policy, law, or rule being adopted by the Member State.‖249

239. Chuck Lindell, Changes in Healthcare Sent to Perry, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN,
June 28, 2011, at B1 (discussing Senate Bill 7, including provisions that ―would allow Texas to join a developing interstate health care compact‖).
240. Patrick B. McGuigan, Texas Joins Missouri, Oklahoma, and Georgia in Historic
Health Care Compact, TULSA TODAY (July 19, 2011), http://www.tulsatoday.com/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=2732 (noting that Texas joined Missouri, Oklahoma, and Georgia).
241. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-48-1 (2011); see Press Release, Ga. Senate Press Office,
Health Care Compacts Heads to Governor‘s Desk in Georgia (Apr. 18, 2011), available at
http://senatepress.net/health-care-compact-heads-to-governors-desk-in-georgia.html.
242. Missouri Enacts Health Care Compact, COLUM. MISSOURIAN (July 14, 2011), http:
//www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2011/07/14/mo-enacts-states-health-care-compact/.
243. See Guy Gugliotta, Some States Seeking Health-Care Compact, WASH. POST, Sept.
18, 2011, at A6.
244. Press Release, Ga. Senate Press Office, supra note 241 (quoting Eric O‘Keefe,
Chairman of the Health Compact Alliance) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id. (quoting Georgia State Senator Charlie Bethel) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
246. Leo Linbeck & Eric O. O‘Keefe, Op-Ed, Health Care Compact Among States Is the
Alternative to Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 22, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.
com/opinion/op-eds/2011/03/health-care-compact-among-states-alternative-obamacare (expressing the opinions of the vice chairman and chairman of Health Care Compact Alliance).
247. Lois Kolkhorst, Compacts Empower States to Decide Health Care Issues, HOUST.
CHRON., July 30, 2011, at B7.
248. H.B. 5, 82d Leg., 1st Called Sess. (Tex. 2011); see also S.B. 7, 82d Leg., 1st Called
Sess. (Tex. 2011).
249. Tex. H.B. 5; see also Lindell, supra note 239 (describing Tex. S.B. 7, including the
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The Texas Compact legislation asserts that the interstate Compact is a way to move control from the federal government to the
states but acknowledges that the Compact is subject to congressional approval before it is enforceable.250
The ostensible authority for interstate compacts comes from
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, providing that ―[n]o State shall,
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State.‖251 The converse suggestion is that
with congressional consent, states may enter compacts with one
another. Health Care Freedom Compact sponsors interpret that
constitutional provision as a stealth weapon in the fight against
federal health reform. Missouri State Representative Eric Burlison suggested that the ―very same article in the Constitution
[that] has been used for the federal government to grow its powers for many decades‖ can be used, instead, as ―a very polite way
[to] ask the federal government to give our authority back.‖252
The states‘ attempted reliance on the Compact Clause to band
together in opposition of federal law is unprecedented and likely
futile. While there is precedent for interstate compacts—over 100
have received congressional approval—they generally address
cross-border problems such as transportation, water rights, drivers‘ licenses, and runaway juveniles.253 In the health care context,
states previously enacted interstate compacts allowing the transfer of institutionalized patients to ensure appropriate follow-up

compact provision, ―which would let Texas distribute its Medicaid, Medicare and children‘s
health insurance money as a federal block grant‖).
250. Tex. H.B. 5.
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
252. Stephen Dinan, State Compacts on Health Care Eyed as End Run Around Obama,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
253. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980)
(uncodified); Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 66800–66801 (West
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893) (upholding
boundary line established by 1803 compact between Virginia and Tennessee); Dinan, supra note 252 (suggesting that more than 100 compacts have passed); Kolkhorst, supra
note 247 (listing examples and suggesting that more than 200 compacts are currently in
operation). See generally Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States
and Between States and a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 224 (1953) (providing a
list of areas in which compacts have been used); George William Sherk, The Management
of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is It Time to Call Uncle?, 12
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 766–67 (2005) (―There is no doubt that the framers of the Constitution expected the states to resolve conflicts among themselves through the use of interstate compacts.‖).
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care.254 Without question, interstate compacts must be approved
by Congress to have any legal force and effect.255 Any disputes
among states arising under interstate compacts fall within the
Supreme Court‘s original jurisdiction.256 Accordingly, it is inconceivable that Congress, having passed the ACA barely two years
ago, with Supreme Court review pending, would approve an interstate compact among states excusing themselves from compliance with the ACA and granting themselves open-ended, nostrings-attached federal funding.257 The question, then, is whether
the Compact sponsors fail to appreciate the futility of their actions, or whether they envision the compact as yet one more way
to signal objection to the ACA.
State-based dissent to the individual mandate has taken two
rather different paths. First, seemingly novel judicial challenges
that are now deemed worthy of consideration by the highest
Court in the land. Second, a variety of state legislative enactments and proposals of dubious legal merit. In both cases, objection to the mandate is framed as states‘ rights, but the essential
contention is infringement on personal autonomy. Because the
individual rights claims are weak, structural federalism arguments are doing the heavy lifting of bringing (and keeping) the
issue to the public fore.258 Skeptics dismiss federalism objections
to the individual mandate as ―opportunistic‖ fronts for substan254. E.g., Interstate Compact on Mental Health, GA. CODE ANN. § 37-10-2 (2011).
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Naujoks, supra note 253, at 225 (distinguishing
compacts subject to congressional approval from agreements among states that do not alter the political power of the affected states, which do not require congressional consent);
Sherk, supra note 253, at 766–67 & n.7 (discussing the congressional consent requirement
relating to interstate water conflicts); Dinan, supra note 252 (quoting UCLA Law Professor, Adam Winkler, as noting that compacts need congressional consent); Sam Baker,
Healthcare “Compact” Advances in Two States, THE HILL (May 18, 2011), http://thehill.
com/blogs/healthwatch/state-issues/162015-healthcare-compact-advances-in-2-states (―[I]n
order to take effect and supersede federal law, an interstate compact needs Congress‘s
stamp of approval.‖).
256. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the Court has original jurisdiction
―[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party‖); e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 126 (1987); Jonathan Horne, On Not Resolving Interstate Disputes, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 95, 98, 147
(2011).
257. See Dinan, supra note 252 (quoting Professor Winkler as stating that ―it doesn‘t
seem likely you can get a bill through the House and Senate and have it signed by President Obama that exempts states from what is President Obama‘s signature achievement‖)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Gugliotta, supra note 242 (Montana Democratic Gov.
Brian Schweitzer, who vetoed that state‘s compact bill, stated that ‗―we will put a person
on Neptune‘ before Congress approves the compact‖).
258. See Moncrieff, supra note 203 (manuscript at 2).
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tive objections to the individual mandate, specifically, and federal
health reform, generally.259
There is no doubt that libertarian, anti-Obama, partisan opposition fuels the health reform debate. Nevertheless, this essay
aims to rebut the reductionist spin on the debate by considering
the individual mandate opposition within the larger context of
state resistance to ACA implementation. Although the individual
mandate has garnered the most attention, several other ACA
provisions bearing on federal-state allocation of power are also
targets of resistance. States balk at increased burdens under
Medicaid, hesitate to embark on new cooperative arrangements
with the federal government under the PCIP and exchanges, and
resist at least certain federal health insurance regulations. Moreover, the Supreme Court‘s willingness to consider the individual
mandate challenge as presented and briefed by twenty-six state
plaintiffs,260 and to hear both state and individual challenges to
261
the federal-state cooperative Medicaid program, amply demonstrates that the federalism arguments are more than rhetorical.
The outcome of those cases and the ongoing ACA implementation
process will, without question, affirm, clarify, and perhaps alter
the allocation of power between states and the federal government.
IV. CONCLUSION
To conclude, I reconsider rhetorical federalism and find the
values262 still tenable two years post-ACA enactment. The values
of rhetorical federalism include bringing transparency to the task
of implementing comprehensive laws, educating the electorate by
distilling the law to discrete issues, giving voice to minority
views, depoliticizing highly charged issues, codifying dissent, and

259. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 125–28 (describing ―opportunistic federalism‖).
260. See U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, ___ U.S. ___,
2011 WL 5515164 at *1 (Nov. 14, 2011); Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393,
___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 5515162 at *1 (Nov. 14, 2011) (consolidating case with Florida v.
U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. No. 11-400, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 5515165 (Nov. 14,
2011).
261. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1262–68 (rejecting the Medicaid challenge); see Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 992 (2011)
(consolidating case with Maxwell-Jolly v. Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 922 (2011)
and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 996 (2011)).
262. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 161–68.
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highlighting the increased role of government in health care delivery.
Continued state resistance to the ACA certainly highlights the
complexity of implementing a comprehensive overhaul of the U.S.
health care system. Discussions over Medicaid, the PCIP, and exchanges reveal the necessary, if at times acrimonious, involvement of both federal and state lawmakers and regulators to carry
out those functions. States may be criticized for using the implementation process to perpetuate partisan fights over health reform. But the strategy of staging objections to discrete provisions
as they roll out over the next several years does have the effect of
parsing the massive package of reforms. As opinion surveys reveal, the public may disfavor the federal health reform law as a
broad concept while actually supporting many particular provisions.263
Health insurance market regulations, which the public generally supports, and the individual mandate, which remains highly
contested, both reveal the increased role of government in the
health care system. I previously suggested that such awareness
could provide a platform for public consideration of more sweeping reform, such as a single-payor system. While the public seems
anything but ready to embrace a universal, government health
care program, we are more aware of the tradeoffs. The validity of
the individual mandate, by the federal government‘s own admission, turns on the complex interrelationship of that requirement
with the ACA‘s guaranteed issue and community rating provisions.264 The individual mandate debate may help ACA opponents
further appreciate that they cannot have the sweet of insurance
market reforms without the bitter of the individual mandate.
Other suggested values of rhetorical federalism are harder to
gauge. One, giving voice to minority views, still seems true in
theory but is less evident in fact. The 2010 midterm elections
shifted the balance of power in the U.S. House of Representatives
to Republicans, and the 2012 presidential election could go to either party. In late 2011, more Americans, and notably more Democrats, expressed a negative view about the law than supported

263. See supra note 163 (citing the KFF survey and other sources).
264. See Brief for Appellant at 28–32, Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021 and 11-1107).
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it.265 Thus, health reform opposition may no longer be the minority view. The expressive function of state HCFAs, compacts, litigation, and implementation moratoria may have contributed to that
opinion shift. If increased understanding of the law and time to
carefully consider its effects have caused support to dwindle, that
may simply be the political process at work rather than any disingenuous conduct by states. Another value of rhetorical federalism is codifying dissent. Even apparently unenforceable state
laws and interstate compacts may memorialize state preferences,
thus providing a jumping off point for future debate,266 should the
new presidential administration or Congress move to repeal the
ACA in whole or in part.
Where I most clearly missed the mark in identifying values of
rhetorical federalism was my suggestion that structural arguments over federal health reform could depoliticize the highly
charged partisan debate. Clearly, in the current environment,
that is anything but true. The issue of the proper scope of federal
power vis-à-vis the states has become the central, signature issue
of ACA opposition. Supreme Court resolution of those questions
could usher in a new era of federal-state relations. Even if the
state-based dissent to the ACA began as an opportunistic federalism strategy to oppose the substantive policies of health reform,
the rhetoric has gained a firm foothold and will leave an indelible
mark.

265. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 3
(2011).
266. See supra Part III.E.2 (describing state legislative activity, post-ACA enactment).

